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Comparative Law as a Bridge Between the  
Nation-State and the Global Economy  
An Essay for Herbert Bernstein*  
Richard M. Buxbaum**  I. INTRODUCTION: COMPARATIVE LAW IN A TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMY What should, what might be the role of comparative law as the regionali‐zation  and  globalization  of  many  segments  of  formerly  national economies  proceed?  I  hope  to  propound  and  weave  together  three strands of my approach to that question.1 The first has to do with the fact that  while  organized  economic  life  increasingly  is  transnational,  much law bearing on the economy still is national law. I say “much law” but the second strand, not surprisingly, has to do with the recognition that much national law, as indeed it has begun to do, must move up one step. This second strand—and second step—concerns the increasing federalization or regionalization of previously national law, as well as the inevitable and perhaps  even  legitimate  lag  of  that  process  behind  the  regionalization and,  at  least  in  its  financial  aspects,  the  globalization  of organized  eco‐nomic life. The third strand bears on the characterization of that part of the  law—be  it  national,  regional,  or  even  global—that  focuses  on  the economy; that is, it bears on the slippery notion of “economic law”, an ill‐defined concept straddling private  law and public  law. For reasons that arise from that exploration, I also propose a mission for comparative law that  I  label  the  “coordination”  mission,  which  in  my  view  promises  a 
 
*  Fourth Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law, Duke Uni-
versity School of Law, Sept. 27, 2005. 
** Jackson H. Ralston Professor of International Law, Boalt Hall, University of California 
Berkeley School of Law. Note from Author: An expanded and slightly footnoted version of the 
Fourth Herbert Bernstein Memorial Lecture given at Duke on September 27, 2005. With some 
exceptions, this version has not been updated to take account of more recent developments. 
I thank Ralf Michaels for his inestimable help in this conversion, even if I did not always follow 
his advice. 
 1. Right away I violate one of Herbert Bernstein’s central injunctions: “Innumerable 
comparatists have felt the urge to marvel over…our discipline. My plea…is: Resist [the urge]. 
What we need much more than such soul-searching is hard–nosed comparative work on 
clearly defined specific institutions or subject-matter areas.” Book Review, 40 Am. J. Comp. 
L. 261 (1992). On the other hand, even he yielded to the temptation once, if only in the form 
of a review essay: Herbert Bernstein, “Rechtsstile und Rechtshonoratioren,” 34 RabelsZ 443 
(1970). 
Richard M. Buxbaum, Comparative Law as a Bridge Between the Nation-State and the Global Economy: An Essay for 
Herbert Bernstein, 1 Duke L. CICLOPs 63 (2009) 
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more fruitful role  for comparative  law in this contemporaneous context than do earlier missions as understood by the first generations of mod‐ern comparative‐law scholars. Given  both  Herbert  Bernstein’s  and my  experiences,  the  legal  re‐gimes  I  am  comparing  are,  not  surprisingly,  the  US  and  European Community/Union regimes. That, however, only becomes relevant as we move to the second‐mentioned strand, that of the possible federalization or regionalization of national law, since it is there that the differences be‐tween  the two  “federal”  (in quotation marks) hierarchies—those of  the United  States  and  those  of  the  European Union—become  relevant.  Let me foreshadow the significance of  this difference to the not‐yet‐defined coordination mission of comparative law: what is important here is that the horizontal coordination of national law within the EC is more impor‐tant  as  a mission  than  is  the  shrinking  need  for  a  similar  coordination mission among the states of the American Union. II. PRIVATE LAW AND ECONOMIC LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY All of this suggests that my presentation will be more about the European than the American scene. Therefore,  let me begin with some brief com‐ments  about  the  situation  in  the  European  Community  (EC),2  because there one can see the third strand more clearly; namely, how the strug‐gles over  the definition of  “economic  law” matter more there than how they matter—though they do—in the United States. Specifically, the rela‐tively  recent  European  focus  on  “private  law”  (as  distinguished  from “public  law”)  arose  and  has  flourished  because  the  heavily  top‐down harmonization  of  laws  considered  essential  to  the  establishment  of  a genuine  Internal Common Market had  to move  into other  spheres than governmental regulation of business—and that of course problematized the distinction between the two sub‐disciplines of  law, as the very con‐cept of “economic law,” straddling them, suggests. 
A. The Focus on European Private Law The origins and motivations of  the current  focus on a European core of private  law  are mixed  and  hard  to  disentangle. Whether  the  relatively new energy pulsing on the private‐law side stems from a defensive strat‐egy against the unsystematic incursions of EC directives and regulations into the national legal regimes, whether it stems from the related effort of the European Court of Justice to provide a modicum of systematic order 
 
 2. I refer to “European Community” rather than “European Union” because my focus on 
economic law suggests the traditional pre-Maastricht division of powers rather than those 
new federal powers added by the additional pillars associated with the “European Union.” 
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to  its  interpretative  jurisprudence,  or  whether  it  stems  from  the  re‐sponses of legal scholarship to the various Decisions and Action Plans of the organs of the EC,3 beginning with the 1989 Decision of the European Parliament  to  support  research  into  the  harmonization  of  the member states’ private  law and culminating for now in the Commission’s Action Program of 2004:4 whatever its origins, the result is clear. The decades‐long monopoly of public‐law scholarship in the European Community is over. European  Private  Law  has  been on  the  agenda  for  over  a decade now, and has developed a dynamic of its own that transcends the various reasons for its original appearance. The mission of the proponents of this expansion or incursion also has varied and evolved. At one end of the spectrum lie efforts to integrate those new  federal  regulations  that  adhere  to  the  classic  codes  like  barnacles without being  integrated  into them.5 The notorious Products Liability Di‐rective is the classic example.6 At the other end lie the ambitious efforts to develop,  if  not  an entire European Civil Code,  at  least major elements of one. The so‐called Lando Principles of European Contract Law is an often‐cited  example of  this  ambition.7 A different mission  is  that of developing principles of adjudication that permit a  greater  integration of varying na‐tional  code  provisions  through  interpretative  techniques,  an  approach 
 
 3. Good examples of this literature include An Academic Green Paper on European 
Contract Law (Stefan Grundmann & Jules Stuyck eds., 2002) and The Harmonisation of 
European Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Prac-
tice (Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2006). 
 4. Commission, “European contract law and the revision of the acquis: the way for-
ward,” COM (2004) 651 final, October 11, 2004; Communication of July 11, 2001, COM 
(2001) final, OJ C255 of Sep 13, 2001; Action Plan of [Feb. 2] 2003, COM (2003) final, OJ C 
63, of 15 March 2003. 
 5. This criticism is a major theme of Karl Riesenhuber, System und Prinzipien des Eu-
ropäischen Vertragsrechts (2003). 
 6. Supra n. 2. The various directives pertaining to consumer protection, in particular 
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (No. 93/13 EEC, in OJ 1993 L95/29), also have given rise 
to system-breach criticism–in this case further conflated with disagreement over the values of 
“weaker-party” protection.  As to the former see, e.g., Geraint Howells & Thomas Wil-
helmsson, EC Consumer Law Aldershot 1997, 19ff, esp. 22; to the latter, Peter Hommelhoff, 
Verbraucherschutz im System des deutschen und europaischen Privatrecht (Heidelberg 
1996) is instructive. 
 7. The Principles of European Contract Law (Ole Lando & John Beale, eds., Dordrecht 
1995). An important if contested additional program is that launched through the Commis-
sion’s Action Plan of 2003 for a “Common Frame of Reference” in the field of contract law 
that would identify the commonalities of national systemic and linguistic usage as an aid to 
courts, legislators, and the private bar. See most recently the Commission’s Communication 
of October 11, 2004, “European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way For-
ward,” COM (2004) 651 final; and the sympathetic explanation of this project in “Uniform 
Terminology for European Contract Law (Gianmaria Ajani & Martin Ebers, eds., Karlsruhe 
2005). 
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found  already  in  1991  in  the  Symposium  of  the  Hamburg  Max‐Planck‐Institute on “Alternatives to Legislative Unification of Law.”8 
B. The Challenge from Economic Law For some time in the 1990s, the effort to position this unification of pri‐vate law in a contemporary version of the usus modernus pandectarum, an  effort  associated  above  all  with  Reinhard  Zimmermann  and  the 
Zeitschrift für europäisches Privatrecht he co‐founded, claimed much at‐tention.9  It  was  always  challenged,  however,  by  another  and  older movement  that  insists on  the  centrality of  economic  law as  the  legiti‐mate and perhaps (though this may be only my view)  limiting basis of any  unification  of  private  law  the  European  Community  should  strive for.  This  focus, which  hews more  closely  to  the  still  largely  economic functions and legitimation of the EC, even in this day of the new pillars of  defense,  security,  environment,  justice,  etc.,  is  not  a  narrow  one. Rather, it is what its proponents in the 1970s titled it: a challenge to the very  concept  of  private  law.10  And  this  tension,  the  challenge modern economic law poses for private law, is my subject today.11 Like Herbert Bernstein, it is a European subject; but, also like him, it illuminates the historic  tension between the (apparently) resolutely un‐systematic  Anglo‐American  conception  of  law  and  the  (apparently) resolutely systematic conception of law associated with the Civilian legal families. This tension is apparent in the very label “economic law.” 12 It is unfamiliar to the US academy, and the very notion that it is a challenge to private  law perplexes us,  if only because the  label “private  law”  itself  is not a significant feature of US legal discourse.13 No teacher of Corporation Law, for example, would worry whether it was a private‐law subject and therefore consider omitting treatment of civil litigation under Rule 10b5; and definitely we would not be concerned about the contours of such an 
 
 8. “Alternativen zur legislatorischen Rechtsvereinheitlichung,” 55 RabelsZ 215 (1992). 
 9. He describes this approach in Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary 
Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford 2001). 
10. Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Gert Brüggemeier, Dieter Hart & Christian Joerges, Wirt-
schaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts (1980). 
11. As it was for a previous Bernstein Lecture: Christian Joerges, “The Challenges of 
Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline,” 14 Duke J. 
of Comp. & Int’l L. 149 (2004). 
12. A digression: In my first year of teaching in 1961, the Italian scholar, Rodolfo de 
Nova, was a visitor at Berkeley. He told me of having met Chief Justice Charles Evans 
Hughes in the mid-1920s, while a young visiting scholar at Yale. In response to Hughes’ gra-
cious question of what he was doing, de Nova told him he was studying the US legal system. 
Hughes responded in turn and apparently without irony: “My goodness; I didn’t realize we had 
a system.” 
13. For the “public-private law” distinction, see n. 40 below. 
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amorphous and pervasive notion as “economic law” in the context of de‐ciding  where  to  place  its  components  in  our  curricular  divisions.  If anything, we have the opposite problem: the dominance of the economic analysis of law across the curriculum is so advanced that, like Voltaire’s Monsieur Jordain, we all speak economic law without knowing it.14 Given this situation, namely,  that  legislating and ruling about mat‐ters  concerning  the economy are a  far  larger part of  the  legislative and judicial tasks of  the past century than they were during the  laissez­faire era,15  and given the  further  fact  that  the  competencies delegated  to the federal  level  of  the  European Union  are  precisely  these economic mat‐ters, it seems to me that the role of Comparative Law in moving any legal agenda  along  deserves  a  new  look.  The  notion  that  economic  law  is  a challenge to private law has a largely European or Civilian flavor about it. But  the  notion  that  economic  law  is  a  challenge  to  traditional  under‐standings about the competencies of units of a federal system is as much an American notion as it is a European one. After all, it was Justice, then Professor, Felix Frankfurter who said of  the Dormant Commerce Clause that so far as the states were concerned, in the absence of federal action 
laissez­faire was the only permissible regulator.16 III. THE VERTICAL DIVISION OF POWERS This brings me to the second strand of  this presentation; namely,  to a comparative (i.e., EC‐US) look at the classic division of powers. Any ar‐gument that national law needs to remain relevant at a  time when the transnational  economy  in  facilitative terms increasingly demands, and in regulatory or redistributive terms increasingly should be required, to accept a transnational legal order has to begin there. Why national law nonetheless should remain relevant, however, will be the final element of this discussion. 
A. Coordination—the Third Function of Comparative Law The term I have elsewhere used to highlight this  function of compara‐tive  law  is  that  of  “coordination.”17  It  joins,  and  supplements,  the  two 
 
14. Another digression: The “it” in that sentence bears two meanings. Many of us, my-
self included, often speak of economic law in this analytical sense without knowing what we 
are talking about. 
15. Its proportional importance during the age of mercantilism is another matter. 
16. Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite (Chapel 
Hill 1937) 65f. 
17. Richard M. Buxbaum, “Die Rechtsvergleichung zwischen nationalem Staat und in-
ternationaler Wirtschaft,” 60 RabelsZ 201 (1996). The similarity of that title with the present 
one is no coincidence, even though the present paper expands the inquiry into dimensions 
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traditional functions of comparative law as these have been accepted in academic discourse  for now almost  two centuries; namely,  the  instru‐mental function of identifying “other” law that might be considered, via appropriate adaptation,18 for one’s own legal order and the visionary or legal‐cultural  function  of  showing  the  path  towards  a  universal  legal order.  The  historian  of  comparative  law  might  associate  Mittermaier with the former,19 Wigmore20 and Kohler21 with the latter function. Coordination implies a horizontal function; specifically, that of the adaptation of a state’s  laws to those of another  formally equal state.  It suggests  a cooperation of  equals within a system  that  is either hierar‐chical in the sense of federal‐state structures or networked as a web of formally equal sovereigns in a structure without a more or less authori‐tative center. In comparative terms, this issue of coordination of course is much more salient  for the European Community/Union than for the United  States.  Despite  the  10th  Amendment  and  the  sputtering  states’ rights discourse, the legal orders of our states exist at the sufferance of the national legal order as authoritatively interpreted, in constitutional terms,  by  our  Supreme  Court.  “Puppy  federalism”  is  Edward  Rubin’s term  for  this  arrangement,22  and an apt  term  it  is,  given  the powerful preemptive  role  of  the  Supremacy  Clause,  especially  in  economic  law. What  little horizontally developed uniformity our  states have  seemed to achieve voluntarily through this coordination function was only vol‐untary in the sense that they acceded to the requirements of the market in  preference  to  what  otherwise  would  surely  have  been  imposed  as national  law;  the  Uniform  Laws  headed  by  the  Uniform  Commercial Code  and  the Model Laws headed  by  the Model Business Corporation 
 
not considered more than a decade ago. 
18. These transplantation problems of course are a favorite subject of comparatists, but 
they are not for today. 
19. The Kritische Zeitschrift fuer Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslan-
des, which Mittermaier co-founded in 1829, in its title [Critical Journal for Legal Science and 
Foreign Legislation] and in his foreword to the first issue, “Ueber den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift” 
[Concerning the Purpose of this Journal], id. at 1, suggests his–and this–“practical” approach. 
A recent appreciation of this approach is that of Heinz Mohnhaupt, “Rechtsvergleichung in 
Mittermaiers ‘Zeitschrift fuer Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes,” in Juris-
tische Zeitschriften (Michael Stolleis, ed., Frankfurt 1999) 282. 
20. On Wigmore’s similar aims, see Annelise Riles, “Encountering Amateurism,” in Re-
thinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Annelise Riles, ed., Oxford 2001) 94. 
21. Josef Kohler, who wrote on almost everything, is noted for his aim at universality 
and the evolution of a world law through the study of comparative law. See, e.g., his Das 
Recht als Kulturerscheinung (Würzburg 1885). For an appreciation see, e.g., Günter Spendel, 
Josef Kohler. Bild eines Universaljuristen (Heidelberg 1983). 
22. Edward L. Rubin, “Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America”, 574 Annals of 
Am. Acad. Of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 37 (2001). 
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Act  illustrate  the point.23  To put  it  another way: what  some states en‐acted as obstacles to the inevitable and inevitably legitimate corporate form of economic activity may not have been removable via the Privi‐leges  and  Immunities  Clause  but  were  rendered  irrelevant  by way  of the Commerce Clause.24 The  European  Community  is  not  yet  at  that stage,  and  its  Supremacy  Clause  has  not  yet  been  lowered  to  room height. The concept of limited delegated powers still is taken relatively seriously, and one of the principal reasons for that constraint bears di‐rectly  on  the  coordination  concept  I  am  proposing  as  a  function  of comparative law. That reason is the so‐called “democratic deficit,”25 the fact  that  the  one  body  directly  elected  by  the  peoples  of  the member states,  the European Parliament,  to  this day  is not yet  a parliament  in the classic sense. Despite the increase in its role of co‐legislator, the leg‐islative  initiative  of  the  EC  remains  with  the  Commission,  an  organ whose  members  are  appointed  by  the  executive  branches  of  the  na‐tional governments represented in the EC’s Council of Ministers. In  this  framework  of  significantly  attenuated  lines  of  democratic legitimation via the aggregate of national electorates,  in which at  least two tiers of  government  lie between any given national polity  and the EU’s  principal  legislative  bodies,  unification  or  harmonization  of  law from  the  top  down  suffers  two  potentially  negative  consequences.  In comparative terms, only one of these also weighs on top‐down unifica‐tion via national  legislation  in  the US,  and even  that one weighs more heavily on the European  law‐making mission than  it does on ours. Let me describe these so that these abstract concepts gain some context. 
B. The Remaining Relevance of National Law The first consequence, the one common to both regions in kind if not in degree,  concerns  the  benefits  of  experimentation  and  flexibility.  The near  consensus on  the benefits of  regulatory  competition,26  or  at  least on using the states as  laboratories,  is applied today to challenge much national or centralized  legislation.  In the United States,  that  is more of an  academic  than  a  practical  argument,  in  part  for  the  reasons  just 
 
23. The uniformity dictated by the quasi-constitutionalized Internal Affairs Doctrine in 
corporation law, leading to the squatter sovereignty of Delaware, is a variant on this theme. 
24. See Richard M. Buxbaum and Klaus J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the Business 
Enterprise (Berlin 1988) 36ff. 
25. Works on this subject are legion; for a recent entrant providing the variations on this 
theme, see Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Christian Joerges, Inger-
Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner, eds., Oxford 2004). 
26. For a respectful critical view of its role for legal scholarship, see Eva-Maria Ki-
esinger, Wettbewerb der Privatrechtsordnung im Europäischen Binnenmarkt (Tübingen 
2002). 
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mentioned. The essential uniformity of US economic law, based on the essential unity of the US economy, has narrowed the field of application in which that desideratum has much purchase;27 and,  to repeat Frank‐furter’s axiom, that competition in any event can only be a race for the bottom in a non‐pejorative sense, that is, it can only be a race to provide market‐supporting facilitative law. The European Union  situation does vary  in degree  if not  in kind from  that obtaining  in  the United  States. The EC member  states’  laws, reflecting  its member states’  less complete economic unity, evidence a higher degree of differentiation. Regulatory variation—not only regula‐tory  competition—will  have  more  bite  there,  and,  given  the  less rigorous  application  of  the  EU  version  of  the  Dormant  Commerce Clause, be less controllable. In this situation, the attraction of top‐down unification,  demanded  now  both  by  the market  and  the more  regula‐tion‐oriented  member  states,  will  be  harder  to  resist.28  As  a  result,  a somewhat peculiar situation will arise, indeed already has arisen. Mar‐ket  pressures  push  for  positive  central  legislation,  but  that  is  a  less desirable solution than the solution the proponents of regulatory com‐petition envisage. Even for those, like myself, who are less convinced of the unalloyed benefits of this beneficent version of the race for the bot‐tom, there  is a concern with some of  the more practical consequences of  top‐down unification  in  the European  context.  The  legislative proc‐ess  is  clumsier  than  in  the  United  States,  the  formal  structure  of directives  with  their  need  for  national  adoption  and  concretization paradoxically  leaves  significant  room  for  resistance  at  the  national level,  and  the  flexibility  needed  for  adaptation  to  changed  circum‐stances is less than optimal.29 The  second  consequence  of  top‐down  unification  or  harmoniza‐tion, the already mentioned democratic deficit, is unique to the EU, and may  be  the  more  significant.  The  coordination  of  lawmaking  among sovereign  states  of  equal  formal  status,  and with  an  identical  need  to adapt to the realities of an economic system that more and more tran‐
 
27. Justice Brandeis’ famous comment in dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 
US 262 (1932) is less regnant today. Consider the battles California had to fight to gain some 
autonomy over regulation of automobile emission standards. 
28. Whether the battle over control of the Delaware phenomenon of mobile corpora-
tions, provoked by the European Court of Justice’s use of the Treaty’s Establishment Clause 
in the Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art cases is an invigoration of a type of Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence or only the beginning of a new round of centralized regula-
tion permitting only a limited range of variation, or of both, is not yet determinable. See 
Richard M. Buxbaum, “Private International Law and Regulatory Competition in Comparative 
Perspective,” RabelsZ (forthcoming 2009). 
29. Buxbaum & Hopt, supra n. 24 at 242f. 
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scends their particular boundaries, offers a better chance of eliminating this  politically  volatile  deficit  than  does  top‐down  harmonization.  It also  provides  a  further  benefit;  namely,  the  power  inherent  in  such  a coordinated  state  network  to  control  the  race  to  the  bottom  faced  by states  standing  in  isolated  and  non‐communicative  competition  with one  another. While  that  sounds  like  a  cartel  of  states,  and  thus  anti‐thetical  to  the very notion of  regulatory  competition,  it  is,  in  terms of accommodating  a  “decent”30  level  of  regulation  and  perhaps  of  redis‐tributive policies, a virtuous cartel. This can profitably be compared with the current effort of the po‐litical  organs  of  the  EC  to  achieve  a  similar  goal  by  combining  the principle of subsidiarity with the principle of minimum common stan‐dards.  Absent  minimum  standards,  the  so‐called  Cassis  de  Dijon principle,31 mandating full faith and credit to the laws of the home state of a legal person whose behavior is sought to be controlled, leads to the market‐driven facilitative law we associate with this race to the bottom. To control this drift, the concept of minimum common standards is su‐perimposed  on  the  subsidiarity  concept, much  as  the  new mandatory minimum  standards  of  the  Sarbanes‐Oxley  Act  are  superimposed  on state  corporation  law  in  certain  sensitive  fields.  Here,  too,  however, some of  the  concerns  just discussed  remain  relevant. While minimum common  standards  are  a  coarser  mesh  than  fully  centralized  law‐making,  they,  by  definition,  cannot  avoid  ossification  and  inflexibility over time, and of course they also still suffer some of  the problems of the described democratic deficit. To  end  this  introduction  to  the  coordination  mission,  one  addi‐tional insight, blindingly obvious, nonetheless is worth making. Market pressure  for  bottom‐up  harmonization  essentially  is  little  more  than pressure  for  uniform measures  facilitative  of  transactions.  To  the  ex‐tent policy disputes exist as to the outer boundaries of  facilitation,  the “market”  solution  taken  in  isolation  only  represents  the  net  power  of the winners of those debates; that is, usually, the private sector provid‐ers  of  the  goods,  services,  and  investments  at  issue,  and  among  them the net power of  the more organized participants (for example, banks 
 
30. I put this in quotes to avoid having to define it. 
31. Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [Cassis de Dijon], [1979] 
ECR 649. The application of this mutual-recognition principle, mitigated by the mentioned 
possibility of uniform minimum standards, was made a keystone of Community legislative 
policy through The White Paper Completing the Internal Market, Com. (85) 310 (June 1985) 
and has found significant application in the free-movement-of-capital and financial-services 
sectors. See the brief overview in George A. Bermann, Roger J. Goebel, William J. Davey & 
Eleanor M. Fox, Cases and Materials on European Union Law (2d ed. St. Paul 2002) at 1175 
f., 1186 f., 1194 f. 
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over  merchants).  Plenty  of  examples  come  to  mind:  the  battle  over shrinkwrap licenses in the failed UCC effort to create an Article 2A; the internecine  battles  over  priorities  in  creditors’  remedies;  the  battle over  labor  codetermination;  the  battles–and  they  are  constant–over appropriate capital market legislation. Market failure, in this context, is a  political  standoff  between  the  proponents  of  discordant  policies; market  success  represents  the  lack of politically  significant policy ob‐jections to facilitative norms. IV. THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC LAWS 
A. The Challenges of Economic Law for Comparative Law Before this coordination mission, with its asserted benefits, can be mean‐ingfully  applied,  its  necessary  attributes  need  to  be  specified,  a requirement  that  returns  us  to  the particular  concept  of  economic  law and  its  mix  of  facilitative  and  regulatory  elements.  Three  assumptions about  the  addressees  of  economic  law  introduce  this  brief  discussion. First, in the present era, the transnational economy is built upon the pri‐vately  (not  state)  owned  business  firm,  a  firm  that  is  hierarchically organized and plans its activities even if they have to exist within a more or  less unplanned economy.  Second,  in  the  short  run,  trade and  invest‐ment  is  largely,  though  of  course  not  totally,  concentrated  at  the  next level above the national economy, the regional economy of blocs, rather than  immediately at  the  fully  global  level. Third,  regional  legal  regimes, preeminent in the EC, of course, with widely different levels of the verti‐cal  division  of  powers  will  exist  but  only  partially  shadow  the  level  of regional economic integration. Following on these assumptions, the central elements of economic law  (and  thus  of  its  coordination)  can  be  better  understood.  Two  ele‐ments stand out. First, despite the tendency to think of the harmonization of private law, the essential core of comparative law will move more than previously towards public law.32 That is in part, of course, due to the sim‐ple definitional assumption that economic law is more than private law. It also, however, is due to the fact that any single state’s effort to legislate about  cross‐border economic matters  in which other states also have a legislative interest needs to consider that legislation’s prescriptive reach across its borders, which by definition means to step beyond the private‐law realm since  that  incursion may meet other policy bases than those 
 
32. For a full review of the current state of that definitional problem and its contexts, see 
Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, “Private Law Beyond the State: Comparative Perceptions and 
Historical Observations,” 71 RabelsZ 345 (2007). 
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supporting the home state’s laws. And as regional legal regimes follow in the  path  of  regional  or  global  economic  regimes,  these  regional  law‐making bodies will have to engage even more fully in these coordination efforts.  Since  they  have  no  higher  hierarchy  to  speak  of,  they  are  con‐demned  to  follow  this  path  to  “doing”  comparative  law  if  they  are  to engage  in  the  process  at  all.  Here  even more  than  on  the  purely  inter‐state level, issues of policy analyses and of the appropriate reach of pre‐scriptive jurisdiction will be essential. Second, the significance of economic and other social‐science ele‐ments  underlying  or  influencing  law‐making  in  any  given  state increases as the substantive differences between different economic or other policy  judgments of other  states  increase. This  impels  compara‐tive law practice to be deepened and contextualized through what one might  call  comparative  social  science  practice.  Put  another  way,  the cryptotypes that Rodolfo Sacco has explored so fruitfully in his study of Legal  Formants  concern  not  only  the  hidden  forms  that  support  legal doctrines but also the hidden forms that support the social‐science or policy judgments underlying those doctrines.33 The uncovering of these cryptotypes thus is inescapably a function, a social‐science function, of comparative  law.  Its  importance cannot be underestimated. At  the do‐mestic  level,  the  various  ideological,  political,  and  economic  conflicts that underlie all law‐making can be left more or less unarticulated, em‐bedded as they are  in the historically contingent path of the particular polity. At the inter‐state level, however, they need to be articulated—to be  translated  and  made  transparent—if  transnational  facilitation  and regulation of economic activity and economic actors are to be success‐fully coordinated. A small example from the extensive debate about the contestable  convergence  of  national  capital  market  laws  comes  to mind:  assumptions  about  the  coming  victory  of  the  US model  of  this type of regulation34—informational  transparency and adequacy  in  lieu of  substantive  regulation—rest  on  more  or  less  articulated  assump‐tions about the depth and liquidity of the American capital markets; i.e., 
 
33. Rodolfo Sacco, “Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law,” 39 
Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 343 (1991). For earlier insights into that issue, both connected with the 
institute with which Herbert Bernstein was long connected, see Andreas Heldrich, “Sozialwis-
senschaftliche Aspekte der Rechtsvergleichung,” 34 RabelsZ 427 (1970); and, early in his 
career, Ulrich Drobnig, “Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtssociologie,” 18 RabelsZ 295 (1953), 
esp. at 304. 
34. An aggressive version of this argument is that of Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kra-
akman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Georgetown L. J. 439 (2001), reprinted in 
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Jeffrey Gordon and Mark Roe, eds., 
Cambridge 2004). 




B. Don’t Talk About ItDo It So the question is fairly posed: can the process of comparative law provide this network of states with the benefits of politically legitimate and  economically  responsible  law‐making  that  can  meet  an  increas‐ingly  globalized  system  of  economic  actors—on  its  own  terms,  so  to speak—while escaping these two pitfalls of lack of adaptability and lack of  democratic  accountability?  With  this  question  I  return  to  Herbert Bernstein’s injunction: don’t talk so much about what comparative law is; start doing it. My case study, a  foolhardy term for the following few remarks, of whether “doing it” is possible is a project that has been un‐der way  for over a  decade  now,  the  Trento  ‘Common Core’  Project of European Private Law.36 This project is based, in turn, on the approach the  late  Rudolf  Schlesinger  took when  in  the  1950s  he  developed  the subject of comparative  law in terms of  its practical utility  for the  legal profession, judiciary, and legislature;37 in other words, following the in‐strumental  mission  of  the  subject.38  Both  began  at  the  bottom,  with close  study  of  the  law  on  the  books  and  the  law  in  action  in  specific fields; Schlesinger’s on contract  law,  the Trento Project on private  law 
tout court. The former’s approach was perhaps too microscopic; in any event,  given  its  limited  resources  it  essentially  exhausted  itself with a definitive, if too narrow, study of the formation of contracts. The Trento Project has had the resources to support a  larger ambition, as  its  title, “The Common Core of European Private Law,” suggests. The most recent substantive study produced by the Project, Eva‐Maria Kieninger’s thorough report on European national law governing non‐possessory security interests in moveables, provides my example.39 
 
35. For recent scholarship recognizing these issues in the field of corporate and capital-
markets law, see John Coffee, “Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and 
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance,” 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1757 
(2002) and Ronald Gilson, “Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or 
Function?,” 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329 (2001). 
36. For a description see Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, Making European Law: Essays 
on the “Common Core” Project (Trento 2000). 
37. Formation of Contracts: A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems (Rudolf B. 
Schlesinger, gen. ed., Dobbs Ferry 1968). 
38. In this he followed his bent towards the practical-analytical; but his larger mission, a 
reflection of his personal history, was an idealistic one closer aligned to the ”universal-law” 
mission, if never ostentatiously trumpeted as such. 
39. Security Rights in Moveable Property in European Private Law (E.-M. Kieninger, ed., 
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First  of  all,  it  is  a  classic  example  of  the  awkwardness  of  fitting  eco‐nomic  law  into  the  standard  private‐public  dichotomy.40  Creditor‐debtor  law,  including  this  sub‐set,  is  a  subject  that  only  exists  inside two very powerful bookends of classical public law—between the con‐sumer protection bookend and the insolvency bookend.41 In that sense, it reveals exactly the challenge and the potential success in seeing com‐parative  law  work  as  a  work  of  coordination;  after  all,  for  policy reasons stemming from different national views of these bookends, the actual doctrines almost  inevitably differ—will have to differ—no mat‐ter  how  strongly market  forces  seek maximum  facilitative  framing  of these  credit devices  in  the applicable  law.  Consider only  the  listing of the issues Kieninger identifies as representing continuing substantially divergent positions:  the publicity requirement  for the creation of non‐possessory proprietary rights; the derogation by contract of mandatory rules of property law such as the retention of title approach to the secu‐rity interest in newly manufactured goods; lease forfeiture in the event of the lessee’s insolvency; the assignability of security interests and the related issue of the notification of the debtor or the public; the validity of  floating  charges  that  cover  all,  even  after‐acquired  property,  of  the debtor;  above  all,  perhaps,  the  variously  mandatory  or  less‐than‐
 
with the assistance of M. Graziadei, Cambridge 2004). Note that this subject is categorized 
as private law in traditional terms, thus implicitly questioning my offhand characterizations in 
the immediately preceding text. 
40. This is—finally—the place at which to look at the contestable private/public law 
distinction in comparative terms. Early assumptions about its dichotomous nature and its 
variously located roots in Roman, Westphalian or 19th century soil have been discredited; see 
in lieu of other citations the thorough study of Martin Bullinger, Öffentliches Recht und Pri-
vatrecht (Stuttgart 1968). Putting aside its remaining power as a means of cartelizing the 
internal distribution of teaching and research chairs, it survived into the 20th century in one 
shorthand form: public law is that whose substantive expression either includes the state as a 
party or the role of state’s institutions in any law’s enforcement, i.e., constitutional and admin-
istrative law in the former case, civil procedure and bankruptcy law in the latter. In the United 
States, the only possible dichotomous classification would have to be an indirect one: if the 
substantive law is enforceable privately (i.e., through contractually authorized arbitration), it is 
private law; if not, it is public. 
But that shorthand classification no longer works, for the same reason that the Civilian 
distinction no longer works. In the first two-thirds of the last century, the state’s increasing 
engagement in providing social goods and curbing private power “publicized” much formerly 
private law and diminished the value of the Civilian distinction. In the last third, the state’s 
increasing disengagement from both the provision of social goods and the regulation of eco-
nomic life diminished the value of the American version of the distinction (almost all “public 
law” is arbitrable today). 
41. “Classical” in the American sense–consumer protection once was non-arbitrable. It 
was not classical in the Civilian sense, since consumer protection did not fit within the formal 
definition of public law (see the preceding footnote). But consumer protection is, in both sys-
tems, a policy limit on the freedom of contract; and in that sense it will display national 
variation as national policy responses to the issue vary. 
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mandatory  rules of private  international  law when  the goods  in ques‐tion cross borders; and more. Transparent communication of individual states’ doctrines and un‐derlying policies among themselves, as equals,  is what the coordination mission of comparative law is about. Its advantages over top‐down har‐monization  lie,  first  of  all,  in  the  inherent  flexibility  of  the  preferred approach. An example taken from the Kieninger volume: Finnish law ap‐parently permits the secured creditor to obtain only 50% of the value of the property covered by a floating (or “enterprise”) charge in the case of the debtor’s  insolvency—a rule that  itself  is a good example of how the typical conflict between institutional lenders and trade creditors arguing over the body of the commercial debtor produces ad‐hoc legislative com‐promises.  Putting  aside  the  actual  fact  that  the  EC  Council  of Ministers did  not wish  to  force  a  reconciliation  of  numerous  such  differences  by forcing a common compromise down the throats of recalcitrant Member States,42 the choice between a top‐down solution and a coordinated inter‐state one seems to me to lie with the latter. A directive or regulation “cur‐ing” (again  in quotes) one or even a series of random variations simply lays  one  patchwork  over  another,  compared  with  the  preservation  of domestic‐level  systemic  and  political  harmony  that  results  when  any given country  is persuaded by this exercise  in comparative  law to coor‐dinate its laws with its fellows through smoothing out its own lumps and bumps.  Those  bumps may  be  simply  the  contingent  result of  historical accident;  they may be the remnants of  local political bargains now ren‐dered  obsolete  by  changing  circumstances,  including  of  course  the development  of  the  common  internal  market  itself;  or  they  may  be needed even today in the context of today’s political bargains. In the last case only, a separate calculation may have to be made whether the local aberration indeed distorts internal‐market conditions to an extent justi‐fying  federal  intervention;  but  in  all  other  cases,  coordinating  local responses within this network frame seems to me a far sounder way to expend  scholarly  and  policy‐making  energy  than  to move  immediately towards imposed unification. Unification may in the end be the preferred solution, but not on an a priori basis. This  may,  of  course,  strike  some  as  simply  “bargaining  in  the shadow of the ruler,” much as we have semi‐coerced market‐driven har‐monization  or  unification  in  what  otherwise  seems  like  open  and voluntary bottom‐up harmonization.43 That objection, however, is not at 
 
42. Kieninger, at 22ff. 
43. The semi-coercive role of the pseudo-constitutional conflicts norm that the law of the 
state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of the corporation is a homely domestic ex-
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all relevant if coordination of law in a system without a hierarch is at is‐sue, and only marginally relevant if the hierarch is not yet omnipotent, as in the EC, rather than all‐powerful as  in the US. And the objection does not touch at all on the two pitfall points I have raised, those of flexibility and  democratic  legitimation,  which  the  state‐based  coordination  ap‐proach largely avoids. Within the context of the world we live in, a multi‐storied economy living in a number of one‐story state houses, a new look at  the missions  of  comparative  law  is  appropriate. Mine,  I  hope,  is  one such look that may open some new approaches to our work. The  coordination mission  of  comparative  law  I  have  suggested  is specifically relevant to economic law and I do not know whether it can be readily applied to those fields of the law that the economic world of Sys‐tem  graciously  permits  the  Lebenswelt,  the  world  of  non‐instrumental actors  like  families  and  friends,  to  govern.44  The  private‐law  norms  of that life‐world also have their overarching policy frame, even if it derives more from what once was unabashedly called “organic life.” What is clear is  that  the  private‐law  norms  of  the  world  of  the  instrumental  actors never have been only that. To the extent the Trento Project belies its self‐professed  “private  law”  core,  to  that  extent  it will  be a  success and  re‐main,  for now, my prime example of  the  comparative advantage of  the coordination mission of comparative law. V. CONCLUSION I suspect that Herbert Bernstein would have been happier had my exam‐ples  come  from  that  Lebenswelt;  after  all,  family  law  was  one  of  his favorite subjects, and the theme of  the Habilitation he abandoned in or‐der  to  come  to  the  new world.  But  it  was  not  his  only  interest,  as  his doctoral dissertation on workers’ compensation45 and his study of the ef‐fects of East German nationalization decrees on the extraterritorial life of those nationalized companies46 demonstrate. Indeed, even his family‐law project was not without  its public‐law overlay, since  it analyzed the  im‐pact of constitutional equal‐protection and non‐discrimination doctrines on  traditional  private  international  law  treatment  of  foreign marriages and local divorces.47 Herbert Bernstein was a widely read, broadly inter‐
 
ample, as already suggested. 
44. This distinction, derived from the phenomenological literature, is fruitfully used in our 
context in Jürgen Habermas, “Law as Medium and Law as Institution,” in Dilemmas of Law in 
the Welfare State (Gunther Teubner ed., Berlin 1985) at 203. 
45. Herbert Bernstein, Schadensausgleich bei Arbeitsunfällen (Karlsruhe 1963). 
46. Herbert Bernstein, Corporate Identity in International Business: The Zeiss Contro-
versy, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 299 (1972). 
47. Herbert Bernstein, “Ein Kollisionsrecht für die Verfassung,” 19 Neue Juristische Wo-





chenschrift 2273 (1965). Left incomplete, it was aptly characterized as a “drumroll without 
symphony” in the review essay of Franz Gamillscheg, “Gleichberechtigung der Frau und Re-
form des Internationalen Eherechts, 33 RabelsZ 654 (1969), at 701f. 
